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Drawing  on  developments  in industrial  organiza-  Even  when  public  enterprises  are  bent  on
tion  and  analyzing  the  U.S.  experinence  in re-  maximizing  consumer  wclfare,  costs  are  not
forming  Conrail,  Kranton  emphasizes  that  nccessarily  minimized.  Control  mcchanisms  that
policies  to reform  public  enterprises  should  first  allow  for  asymmetric  information  between  layers
promote  cost  reduction.  Pricing  policies  aimed  of  management  and  provide  per'ormance  incen-
at  cost  recovery  should  be  undertaken  only  in  tives  encourage  efficiency.  Regulation  may
conjunction  with  general  enterprise  reform,  to  cause  inefficiency  by  distoning  incentives  and
ensure  that  the  pricing  scheme  does  not  under-  creating  protected  markets.  And  enterprises  that
mine  the  enterprise's  financial  and  operational  operate  in  uncompetitive  markets  may  face  little
discipline.  pressure  to operate  efficiently.
Kranton  discusses  five  sources  of  ineffa-  Lack  of  competition  may  also  exacerbate  the
ciency  in public  transport:  problem  of  asymmetric  inforrnation  between
owners  and  managers.  Owners  ol' public  firmns
- The  goals  of  the  enterprise  or  the regulation  -citizenls  and  taxpayers  - are  unlikely  to exert
of  its operations.  pressure  oni public  enterprises  to operate  cff'i-
cienily.  And  public  firms  may  be  protected  from
*  The  structure  of' the  output  market.  insolvency  by "solt"  budget  constraints.
*  The  control  mechanism  between  govern-  Kranton  points  out  the  need  for  an  integrated
ment  and  the  enterprise.  theory  of  public  production  (to  help  formulate
policies  to minimize  costs)  and  more  empirical
*  The  managerial  incertive  structure.  work  to explain  the  differences  in costs  between
public  and  private  enterprises.
*  'I'he  conditions  ol'employmenit.
The PRE  Worki,ig Paper  Series  dlissenminates  the  findings  or %kork  under  way  in the Bank's  Policy, Rcscarch,  and  External
Affairs Complex.  An objectiv'c  of the  sCries  is to get  thesc  findings  out  quickly, even  if presentations  arc  less  than  fully
polished.  The findings,  interpretations,  and  conclusions  in these  papers  d(o  not necessarilv  represent  official Bank policy.
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1.  Little  theoretical  work has been devoted  to developing  an
integrated  theory  of public  production  to analyze  the impact  of pricing
and  cost recovery  policies  on public  sector  efficiency. The  principles
for cost recovery  are based on the optimal  pricing literature:  the
derivation  of prices  to raise  a given  level  of  revenues  while  minimizing
welfare  losses. In  the  analysis,  however,  an  implicit  assumption  is  made:
public sector  managers  minimize  production  costs.  In their work on
transport  tariffs,  Allais  and others  writing  for the  EEC emphasized  in
1965 that cost minimization  was an essential  condition for optimum
allocation  of resources:  "cost  minimization  may be regarded  as having  a
certain logical priority  and it must be clearly understood  that in
practice  if costs  are  not minim'zed,  most of the  criteria  corresponding
to  optimal  allocation  of resou:ces  can  only  have  a  very  limited  effect."l/
However,  minimizing  costs,  has not been given  priority  in theories  of
pricing  and cost recovery,  or in their  application. The assumption  of
efficient  production,  borrowed  directly  from the theory  of perfectly
competitive  markets,  precluded  consideration  of  market  imperfections  which
might  undermine  the  way in  which  prices  influence  allocative  efficiency.
It also discouraged  the search  for alternative  measures,  such as cost
reduction,  to improve  allocation  of resources.  Furthermore,  application
of optimal  pricing  regimes  without  regard  to the true origin  of costs
could,  at best,  distort  consumer  prices  --  creating  further  allocative
inefficiency  --  and,  at  worst,  undermine  incentives  to  promote  production
efficiency.
2.  The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  assess  the  efficacy  of  optimal
pricing  formulas  for  pricing  and  cost recovery  and to develop  a general
framework  within  which to analyze  the performance  of public  transport.
1/  Maurice  Allais,  et  al.,  Options  in  Transport  Tariff  Policy,  European
Economic  Community,  Transport  Series  1, Brussels,  1965,  p. 36.
1Part  II  critiques  the  optimal  pricing  literature  and  its  policy
prescriptions for cost recovery,  Part III presents theoretical work in
other fields such as industrial organization, principal-agent problems,
and privatization which try to explain the lack of cost minimization in
public enterprises.  Four departures from perfectly competitive markets
are considered: asymmetries  of information (the  principal-agent problem),
regulation, non-competitive markets, and imperfect capital markets and
public  ownership.  This  leads  to  Part  IV  which  derives  a  general
analytical  framework  to analyze  causes of  production  ineffLiincy  in
public transport.  Part  V uses the framework  to analyze the refcrmn  of Penn
Central Railroad in the U.S. which led to the creation of Conrail.
2II.  OPTIMAL  PRICING  POLICIES  AND  COST  RECOVERY
3.  The  basic  principles  of optimal  pricing  and  taxation  for  cost
recovery  in  public  production  can  be  divided  into  two  categories:  optimal
prices/taxes  to raise  a given  amount  of revenue  from the economy  as a
whole and optimal  prices  for individual  firms  operating  under  a b-dget
constraint.  In both approaches,  public  production  is assumed to be
efficient. World  Bank  policies  for  general  cost  recovery  2/  and  pricing
and  cost  recovery  in  transport  3/  are  based  on  this  optimal  price  theory.
However,  the application  of these  pricing  formulas  when costs  are not
minimized, can undermine the welfare gains usually associated  with
introduction  of an optimal  pricing  regime. Furthermore,  in the  economy-
wide case,  instituting  a  system  of  optimal  taxes  aad  transfers  when  costs
are not minimized  can itself  be a cause of inefficiency  in the public
sector.
Economy-Wide  Optimal  Taxes
4.  Frank  Ramsey  derived  an  optimal  system  of economy-wide  taxes
in his 1927 article  by solving  the problem  of maximizing  total  welfare
:ubject  to the  constraint  that  the  state  must raise  a certain  amount  of
revenue  through  taxation.4/  He concluded  that  the  ad  valorem  tax  on  each
commodity  should  be proportional  to  the  sum  of the  inverses  of  the  supply
2/  World  Bank, "Cost  Recovery  Policies  for  Public  Sector  Projects",
Operational  Manual  Statement  2.25,  1977.
3/  Bennathan,  E. and  A. Walters,  'Port  Pricing  and  Investment  Policy
for  Developing  Countries",  O.U.P.,  1977;  Chu-chill,  A., 'Road  User  Charges
in  Central  America,"  Johns  Hopkins  U. Press,  Baltimore,  1972;  Newbery,  D.
et al, 'Road  Transport  Taxation  in Developing  Countries:  The Design  of
User Charges  and Taxes for Tunisia",  Discussion  Paper  26, World  Bank,
Washington,  1987;  Walters,  A.,  'The  Economics  of  Road  User  Charges,"  Johns
Hopkins  U. Press,  Baltimore,  1968.
4/  Frank Ramsey, 'A Contribution  to the Theory of Taxation,"  The
Economic  Journal,  Vol. 37,  1927,  p. 47-61.
3and demand  elasticities. The policy  recommendation  arising  from this
result is  that to  mnm  w.e  welfare losses, commodities  which  are
relatively  inelastically  supplied  and demanded  should  be taxed.  The
revenues  raised by these taxes should then be used to fund general
government  services,together  with the  deficits  of public  enterprises  and
other  public  agencies.
S.  In  a  1937  address  Hotelling  proposed  a  pricing  policy  for  U.S.
railroads Lnd  bridges based on  this  theoretical  argument.5/  He
recommended  that  to  maximize  welfare,6/  bridge  tolls  should  be  zero,  while
railway  fares  should  be set  equal  to the  marginal  costs  of carrying  one
additional  passenger,  or  servicing  a  single  shipment  of  freight.  Revenues
to  meet the  bridge  and  railway  deficits  resulting  from  charging  marginal
costs should be  raised through income, inheritance,  or land taxes.
Setting  tolls  above  zero,  or charging  fares  above  marginal  costs,  would
entail  a loss in  welfare  since  it  would  encourage  customers  to turn  to
alternative  travel  modes --  the demand for bridges  and railways  was
assumed  to be elastic. On the  other  hand  taxing  income,  inheritance,  or
land  would  entail  minimal  loss  in  welfare  because  these  items  were  assumed
to  be inelastically  supplied.
6.  In  a recent  paper  Heady  reiterates  the  above  recommendation:
to minimize  welfare  losses  ("distortion4ry  costs")  public  sector  prices
should  take into  account  relative  elasticities  of demand  for publicly-
produced  goods and services  as well as for commodities  taxed  by the
5/  H. Hotelling,  'The General Welfare in Relation  to Problems  of
Taxation  and of Railway  and  Utility  Rates,"  Econometrica,  Vol. 6, 1937,
p. 242-269.
6/  Welfare in this case is the sum of consumer  surplus,  producer
surplus,  and government  revenue. The loss in welfare  by pricing  above
marginal costs would therefore  equal the  standard  dead weight loss
triangle.
4government.7/  Individual  enterprises  should  not  be subject  to their  own
financial  constraints,  rather
'prices  should  be raised  on those goods with a high ratio of
marginal  gain  to  marginal  distortionary  costs,  and  lowered  for  those
where that ratio  is low  . . this  leads  to the  well-known  rule
that the retio of consumer  price to producer  price should  be
inversely  proportional  to the own-price  elasticity  of demand"  8/.
Optimal  Prices  for  Individual  Firms
7.  Pricing rules for individual  enterprises  facing  financial
const-aints  were esrived  by Boiteux  9/  and  Baumol  and  Bradford.10/  Many
public  sector firms  are characterized  by increasing  returns  to scale,
which  means  that  marginal  cost  pricing  would  result  in negative  profits
and financial  deficits.11/  They  therefore  determined  the  optimal  prices
above marginal  costs  which allowed  a nationalized  industry  to earn a
specified level of  profits.12/  Maximizing consumer welfare  (the
compensating  variation)  subject  to the enterprise's  budget  constraint
yielded  the  now  well-known  equations  for  optimal  prices:  the  percentage
markup  of  price  over  marginal  cost  is inversely  proportional  to the  own-
7/  C.  Heady,  Public  Sector  Pricing  in  a  Fiscal  Context,  The  World  Bank,
PPR  Working  Paper  No.  WPS-179,  1989,  p. 13-30.
8/  Ibid, p. 26. Heady also considers  the distributional  impact  of
public  sector  pricing  and  recommends  weighting  consumer  losses  according
to the  distribution  of income.
9/  H. Boiteux,  'On the Management  of Public  Monopolies  Subject  to
Budgetary  Constraints,"  Journal  of  Economic  Theory,  3, 19'1,  p. 219-240.
English  translation  of the original  French  article  "Sur  la gestion  des
Monopoles  Publiques  astreints  a l'equilibre  budgetaire,"  Econometrica,
Vol.  24,  No.  1, Jan.  1956,  p.22-40.
10/  W.  Baumol  and  D. Bradford,  (1970)  "Opti:rAl  Departures  from  Marginal
Cost  Pricing,"  American  Economic  Review,  Vol.  60,  p.265-283.
11/  In  transport,  fixed  costs  include  the  initial  capital  investment  and
maintenance  expenses  to  protect  infrastructure  from  weathering.
12/  These  profits  could  he equal  to  zero.
5price  elasticity  of demand.l3/ In practice,  this  method  of pricing  has
been  simplified  to  the  problem  of  maximizing  welfare,  defined  as  consumer
surplus  alone  or the sum  of consumer  and  producer  surpluses,  subject  to
the  enterprise's  budget  constraint.
8.  The  designation  of the  prices  derived  by Boiteux,  Baumol  and
Bradford  as "Ramsey  prices'  is  often  a source  of confusion.  To reiterate
the  difference:  Ramsey,  Hotelling,  and  recently  Heady concerned  with  the
government'..,  fiscal  position,  found  that to raise a required  level  of
general  revenue,  taxes  should  be levied  on goods  inelastically  supplied
or demanded. Boiteux  and Baumol  and Bradford,  on the other  hand,  were
concerned  with the  firm's  financial  position  and  develop4d  an  optimal  way
of setting  prices  above  marginal  costs  in  a  manner  which  minimized  welfare
losses  while raising  sufficient  funds from the buyers  of the good or
service  produced.
Extensions  and  Applications  of  Optimal  Pricint  Literature
9.  The  pricing theory presented above  spawned a  body  of
literature  which  extended  the  basic  models  to  account  for  more  complicated
circumstances  such  as  externalities  (including  congestion,,  tax  incidence
and income  distribution.14/  These  pricing  rules  can be applied  to all
public  agencies  including  airlines,  railroads,  toll bridges,  and urban
traffic.15/
13/  An enterprise  which  produces  more  than  one  commodity  would  also  need
to  consider  how ircreasing  the  price  of one  commodity  affects  the  demand
for  the  other  commodities  produced  (the  cross-price  elasticity  of demand)
and  thus  the  enterprise's  total  revenue  potential.
14/  See  Dieter  Bos, 'Public  Sector  Pricing,"  Chapter  3 of Handbook  of
Public  Economics,  Vol. I, A.J. Auerbach  and M. Feldstein  (eds),  North
Holland,  1985,  p.182-183.
15/  Ibid.  p. 130.
610.  Current  Bank  policy  or.  cost recovery  is based  on the above
theoretical  work on optimal  priciing  and taxation.  Operational  Manual
Statement  2.25,  "Cost  Recovery  Policies  for  Public  Sector  Projects,
--  which  is  concerned  with  recovering  the costs of public sector
investments  through  pricing  or  taxation  --  reflects  the  continued  reliance
on the  theoretical  pricing  literature:16/
The revenues resulting from charging such "efficiency  prices,
(marginal  cost  prices)  may or may  not recover  the  total  financial
cost  of the  facilities  provided. The  second  set  of considerations
relates  to the desirability  of adjusting  the efficiency  prices
(optimal  pricing  above  mar.anal  cost),  or  charging  alternative  taxes
(optimal  general  taxation!,  because  of  fiscal  and  financial  concerns
. . .(emphases  added)
11.  In the transport  sector  internal  Bank research  has provided
detailed  guidance  for  pricing  and  cost  recovery  in roads  (both  urban  and
inter-urban)  and  ports. Summaries  of these  recommendations  can  be found
in  the  EDI  publication  Pricing  Policy  for  Development  Management.17/
Recent  work on roads  emphasizes  the  use  of road  user  charges  to recover
the  costs  of the  road  network.13/  The  derivation  of "optimal'  road  user
charges  to minimize  the  distortion  in consumption  is reminiscent  of the
Ramsey  pricing  formulas  for  the  entire  economy  presented  above.19/  In  the
railways  sector,  where  the  emphasis  has  been  on  improving  costing  systems,
16/  The  World  Bank,  OMS 2.25,  1977,  p.l.
17/  Meier,  Gerald  M. (ed.),  Pricing  Policy  for  Development  Management,
Economic  Development  Institute  of  the  World  Bank,  the  Johns  Hopkins  Press,
Baltimore,  1983.  See Chapter  4.2 for  *idges,  Chapter  4.7 for roads,
Chapter  4.8 for ports,  and Chapter  4.11 for general  prescriptions  for
transport  pricing.
18/  See D.M. Newbery et al., Road Transport  Taxation  in Developing
Countries:  The  Design  of User Charges  and Taxes  for  Tunisia,  World  Bank
Discussion  Paper  No.  26,  1987  and  review  in  Vincent  Hogg,  Pricing  and  User
Charging  in the Transport  Sector:  A Review  of FY88 Transport  Project
Operations,  The  World  Bank,  Report  INU-ORl,  April  1989,  p. 11.
19/  Op  Cit,  Newbery  et al.,  p. 55 and  p.75.
7more attention  has focused  on financial  viability  and the  importance  of
raising  revenue  to  cover  total  costs  through  pricing.20/  For  ports,
theoretical  work  cc.aducted  by the  Bank  established  marginal  cost  pricing
as the  proper  basis  for  tariffs.21/
Problems  Caused  by  Assuming  Cost  Minimization
12.  The theoretical  work which provided the basis for these
pricing  pol'cies  maintained  the  assumption  of  efficiency  in  public  sector
production.  This  tendency  was  so  strong  that  even  in  models  which  assumed
objectives  other  than  profit-maximization  or  welfare-maximization  --  goals
such  as politicians  maximizing  votes,  bureaucrats  maximizing  budgets,  or
managers  m&ximizing  output  or revenue  --  the assumption  of efficient
production  was  maaintained.22/  The  convenience  of assuming  minimum  costs
is  understandable  in  theoretical  work,  out  maintaining  this  assumption  in
application  when it frequently  does not hold could,  at best, distort
consumer prices --  creating further allocative inefficiency --  and, at
wiorst,  create  additional  incentives  for  inefficiency.
13.  Optimal  prices  for individual  fir.as  are those  prices  which
minimize  the  loss  to  welfare  from  pricing  above  the  minimum  marginal  cost.
The  basic  reasoning  is  that  welfare  will  be  maximized  when  prices  reflect
the relative  scarcity  of goods.231  If costs are not minimized,  then
prices  set  according  to the  above  principles  would  be based  on inflated
costs  and  will  not  accurately  represent  the  opportunity  costs  of  producing
the goods.  The  price signal  which  consumers  receive  is then  distorted
beyond  that  of  the  distortion  associated  with  pricing  above  marainal  cost.
20/  Op Cit,  Vincent  Hogg,  p. 20.
21/  2k_Cit,  Vincent  Hogg,  p. 26.  See E. Bennathan  ard  A.A. Walters,
Port Pricing  and Investment  Policy  for  Developing  Countries,  World  Bank
Research  Publication,  O.U.P.,  1977.
22/  Op Cit,  Dieter  Bos,  p.182-183.
23/  Op Cit,  Dieter  Bos,  p. 165.In addition,  the inflated  prices  pass on to the  consumers  the  costs  of
entropy  and ineffit  ancy in the public  firm.24/  Setting  prices  above
marginal  costs  in  proportion  to the  inverse  of the  demand  elasticity  for
a si..gle  firm's  prices  minimizes  the  familiar  dead-weight  loss  triangle.
However,  if  the  costs  of the  public  sector  enterprises  are  not  minimized,
the loss  of welfare  would  be  higher. The loss  to  welfare  from  charging
above  the  true  marginal  cost  would  be the  sum  of the  loss  in  welfare  from
pricing  above  marginal  cost  (the  dead-weight  loss)  and  the  loss  in  welfare
from  the  reduction  in  net  potential  surplus.  This  is shown  in  Figure  1.
14.  Economy-wide  systems  of  Ramsey  prices  set  taxes  on  commodities
which are relatively  inelastically  supplied  and  demanded. Under such  a
scheme certain public enterprises, those that produce goods with
relatively  elastic  demands,  would  receive  transfers  from  the  government
to meet their  cests.  Not considered  in the  pricing  literature  is the
possibility  that  receiving  these  transfers  might loosen  the  constraints
under  which  the  firm  operates  and  lessen  the  incentive  to  minimize  costs.
Receiving  regular  and  continuous  transfer  payments  to cover  deficits
'softens'  the  budget  constraint  of the  recipient  firm  25/. A decision-
maker,  constrained  by  a "hard"  budget  constraint  to  cover  total  costs  with
only thc  tevenue  raised  by sales,  will exert  efforts  to minimize  costs,
lest  the  costs  exceed  the  revenues.  A "soft"  budget  constraint  cannot  act
as the  same  ex ante  behavioral  constraint  on  management. The  management
is  not  required  to  make  expenditures  equal  to  or  less  than  total  revenues,
and therefore  has little  incentive  to  minimize  costs. Managers  come  to
rely  on the transfer  payments  and correctly  expect  that their  firm  will
receive  transfer  payments  to  cover  costs. Ex  post  costs  are  covered,  but
24/  H. Leibenstein,  Beyond  Economic  Man,  Cambridge,  Harvard  University
Press,  1976,  p. 72.
25/  Tax  exemptions,  soft  credit,  and  adjusting  the selling  price  also
soften  a  firm's  budget  constraint.  See  Janos  Kornai,  "Adjustment  to  Price
and Quantity  Signals  in a Socialist  Economy,"  Economie  Appliqt'ee,  Vol
XXXV,  No.  3,  1982,  p. 506-507  and  Comments  on  Papers  Prepared  in the  World
Bank  about  Socialist  Countries,  The  World  Bank,  CPD  Discussion  Paper  No.
1985-10,  March  1985.
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P is  the  price  based  on  minimum  marginal  costs,  MC.  Q is  the
quantity  sold  at that  price. The  welfare  loss  associated  with the
increase  in  price  above  marginal  costs  is  represented  by the  shaded
triangle.
P' is the price  based  on the inflated  marginal  costs,  MC'.
Q'  is  the  quantity  sold  at  price  P'. In  this  case,  the  welfare  loss
associated  with the  increase  in  price  above  minimum  marginal  costs
is represented  by the area of both the shaded  triangle  and the
cross-hatched  area.
Figure  1. Loss in welfare  associated  with pricing  above  marginal  costs  when
marginal  costs  are inflated.
10the  budget  constraint  no longer  constrains  managerial  behavior  and  becomes
merely an accounting  or book-keeping  identity.  Conversely,  financial
targets  and  binding  profit  constraints  could  increase  managerial  efforts
to  minimize  costs  under  specific  assumptions about  managerial
objectives.26/
Empirical  Evidence
15.  Empirical  studies  have shown  that costs  tend to "drift"  in
firms  which receive  subsidies  from  government  to cover  deficits. Lump-
sum subsidies  in the regulated  public  buses in the U.S.  were shown  to
result  in  cost increases.27/ A comparative  study  of publicly-owned  bus
companies  in OECD  countries  showed  that twenty-five  to fifty  percent  of
transfer  payments  were  absorbed  by increased  unit  costs.28/ The  relevant
question  for  welfare  analysis,  however,  is a comparison  of the  gain in
welfare  from  instituting  optimal  prices  and  the  loss  in  welfare  associated
with cost  drift.  Heggie  has  demonstrated  that  a 202 increase  in  prices
has the same  absolute  effect  on  welfare  as a 2Z decrease  in costs  in a
market  with  unitary  elasticity  of demand.29/  Reductions  in  costs  have  an
even larger  relative  welfare  gain  when there  are increasing  returns  to
s:ale,  as is the case in many transport  enterprises.  The implicit
assumption  of minimum  costs in pricing  literature,  is therefore  not a
neutral  assumption  and  may  even  contribute  to  the  problem  of  public  sector
inefficiency. If pricing  is to be the instrument  of choice  for cost
recovery,  care  should  be taken  to  insure  that  instituting  a  pricing  scheme
26/  H. Gravelle and E. Katz,  "Financial Targets and X-efficiency in
Public Enterprise," Public Finance, Vol. 31, 1976, p. 218-234.
27/  Moshe Kim and Menahem Spiegel, "The Effects of Lump-Sum Subsidies
on the Structure of Production and Productivity in Regulated Industry,"
Journal of Public Economics, Vol 34, 1987, p.105-119.
28/  P.H.  Bly, F.V.  Webster,  and Susan  Pounds,  "Subsidization  of Urban
Public  Transport,"  Supplementary Report  No.  766,  Transport  and  Road
Research  Laboratory,  Crowthorne,  U.K.,  1983.
29/  Ian  Heggie,  Pricing,  Cost  Recovery,  and  Efficient  Resource  Use in
Transport, The World Bank, INUTD Discussion Paper, December 1989, p. 17.
11does not undermine the financial  and operational  discipline  of the
enterprise.
12III. CAUSES  OF INEFFICIENCY  IN PUBLIC  TRANSPORT
16.  Public  transport  enterprises  often  have explicit  goals  which
may  be  quite different from the  efficient provision of  services.
Enterprises  may have multiple  objectives  such as: providing  jobs  with
secure  salaries  as a  type  of  employment  program,30/  maximizing  passenger
miles,  maintaining  a  network  of services,  providing  low  cost  services  to
rural  and  urban  poor,  etc.31/  These  objectives  may  be explicit  goals  of
the enterprise,  or imposed by government  on the enterprise  through
regulation.  The  pursuit  of  these  other  goals  can  cloud  the  issue  of cost
minimization. For example,  a railroad  whose goal is to provide  both
employment  and railway  services  will  not  minimize  costs  in the  commonly-
understood  sense.32/  The  railroad  will  employ  more  labor  in  the  provision
of railroad  services  than  with the loptimal"  combination  of inputs  which
minimizes  costs,  given  market  wages  and  prices. The  pursuit  of  explicit
goals other than  welfare  maximization,  such as those  mentioned  above,
result  in the lack  of cost  minimization  in public  transport  and can be
readily  identified  as causes  of high operational  costs.  Furthermore,
theoretical work  in  the  fields of  mechanism design,  industrial
organization,  and privatization  provide  reasons  to believe  that public
sector  production  may be inefficient  even in the  mist restrictive  case
when government  has the  single  goal  of  maximizing  consumer  welfare.
30/  See  Alice  Galenson,  Labcr  Redundancy  in the  Transport  Sector,  The
World  Bank,  PPR  WPS-158,  February  1989,  p. 27-32.
31/  Eric  W. Beshers,  A Survey  of Restrictive  Practices  on Railways  in
Developing  Countries,  p.11.  Forthcoming  INUTD  publication.
32/  Given  the goal  of creating  employment  opportunities,  the relevant
question becomes not  the  efficiency of  the  operation, but  the
effectiveness  of  the  enterprise  in  accomplishing  this  goal. Arturo  Israel
discusses  the difference  between "effectiveness"  and  'efficiency"  in
Institutional  Development,  Incentives  to Performance,  The John Hopkins
University  Press,  Baltimore,  1987,  p. 12-14.
13Problems  of  Control  and  the  Principal-Agent  Problem
17.  The principal-agent  problem is a problem  of control:  the
principal  is the party  which establishes  control  and the agent is the
party which operates  under those controls  and has access to private
information.33/  In the private  sector,  for  example,  managers  of a firm
know  the  level  of  effort  they  exert  on  the  job,  while  shareholders  cannot
directly  observe  these  efforts. In  order  to induce  the  manager  to  exert
the  optimal  amount  of effort,  the shareholders  can  design  a contract,  a
control  mechanism,  that  induces  the  manager  to  undertake  the  optimal  level
of  effort. This  contract  provides  incentives  for  the  manager  at  the  least
cost  to  the  shareholders  and  minimizes  the  loss  in  efficiency  which  arises
from  thie  inability  of the  shareholders  to  directly  observe  the  managers'
effort. In the  public  sector  we can  identify  a  hierarchy  of control  and
an  associated  principal-agent  problem  at each  level:34/





18.  At each layer  the  principals  and the agents  may have well-
defined  yet  different  goals  and  have  access  to  different  information,  thus
creating  the  possibility  of inefficiency.  An optimal  control  mechanism
between  each  layer  could  reduce  the  inefficiencies  which  result  from  the
inability  of the  principal  to  directly  observe  the  actions  of the  agent.
Defining  and describing  the nature  of the existing  control  mechanism
between  each level  could provide  valuable  insight  into the source  of
inefficiencies  in public sector  production.  Once the nature of the
33/  David  Sappington  and  Joseph  Stiglitz,  "Information  and  Regulation,"
in Public  Regulation,  Elizabeth  Bailey  (ed.),  MIT  Press  1987,  p. 6-7.
34/  A similar  hierarchy  can  be described  for  private  sector  production:
OWNERS  - MANAGERS  - EMPLOYEES.
14control  relationship  is  understood,  the  principal's  access  to information
can  be expanded  and  the  mechanisms  of  control  can  be restructured  in  order
to reduce  operational  inefficiency. Some insights  on three important
levels  of  the  control  problem  are  presented  below:  (i)  between  owners  and
managers;  (ii)  between  managers  and labor;  and (iii)  between  government
and  the  enterprise.
Owners  and  Managers
19.  In  large organizations,  there is often a  separation  of
ownership  and  control. The  managers  of  the  firm,  rather  than  it's  owners,
are  also likely  to have  better,  if  not exclusive,  information  about  the
firm's  costs,  operations,  and  market  structure  and  their  own effort.35/
Owners  and  managers  also  pursue  different  objectives.  Owners  are  usually
assumed  to be solely  concerned  with maximizing  profit,  in the case of
private  firms,  or  maximizing  total  welfare,  in  the  case  of public  firms.
Managers'  utility,  in both cases, is assumed to depend  on their own
monetary  reward  and  the  level  of effort  they  exert  on the  job. In order
to reduce  the  divergence  between  these  goals,  a contract  can  be designed
which induces  the  management  to act to  maximize  the owners'objectives.
The owner's  problem  is to design  a contract,  a wage agreement,  which
induces  managers  to  exert  the  optimal  level  of  effort:  the  level  of  effort
which  maximizes  profit  in  the  private  case  and  welfare  in  the  public  case.
However,  the  owner  cannot  directly  observe  the  level  of effort  exerted.
20.  The  problem  of  designing  optimal  contracts  must  consider  this
asymmetry in information  between owners and managers.  With perfect
information,  owners  would  be able  to  directly  relate  salaries  to effort.
However,  in both the public  and large-scale  private  sector,  owners  are
35/  In the theoretical  literature  a distinction  is  made between  hidden
actions and hidden characteristics. Moral hazard problems refer to
problems  where  the  principal  cannot  observe  the  agent's  action  - such  as
effort. Adverse  selection  problems  refer  to  problems  where  the  principal
cannot  observe  characteristics  that  can  be observed  by the  agent  - such
as the  firm's  true  costs.
15removed  from the day-to-day  operations  of the firm  and cannot  directly
observe the effort managers on the job; they can only observe the
profitability  of the firm.  The  managers,  on the other  hand,  know both
their  level  of  effort  and  the  profitability  of the  firm.  For  example,  a
firm's  shareholders  do  not  participate  in  the  daily  operations  of  the  firm
and do not observe  the daily  conduct  of the firm's  management.  These
shareholders,  however,  can read the annual  reports  and attend  annual
shareholders  meetings to  determine the profitability  of  the  firm.
Taxpayers,  the  owners  of  public  firms,  are  even  further  removed  from  the
daily  operations  of public  enterprises. This asymmetry  in information
constrains  the  design  of contracts  between  owners  and  management  because
contracts  cannot  be writtpn  directly  on the level  of effort  exerted  by
managers. Contracts  written  on observable  variables  such  as the firm's
profit  that  do not  provide  inducements  to the  managers  to exert  effort
could  leave  managers  with little  incentive  to act  efficiently.  Managers
would  therefore  exert  less  than  the  optimal  level  of  effort. Less  effort
implies  less care in keeping  costs  down and could  thus be a source  of
inefficiency.36/
21.  A large  body  of literature  addresses  the  problem  of designing
an 'optimal  contract"  under  various  assumptions  about  the  degree  of risk
aversion  of the  manager  and the  form  of the  managers'  utility  function.
Many of the  models  share  the following  features:37/  (i)  the  manager  is
risk averse; (ii)  the  manager  has  more information  about the costs  of
production  than the principal;  (iii)  the manager  has an incentive  to
misrepresent  the  true  costs  in  order  to  increase  his  own  utility;  and (iv)
the  main instrument  used to induce  the  managers  to act in the owners'
interest  is  a contractual  payment  of  contingent  compensation  to  managers.
36/  Lafont and Tirole, "Using  Cost Observation  to Regulate  Firms,"
Journal  of Political  Economy,  Vol 94,  No.  4, 1986,  p. 614-641. See  also
Op Cit,  Sappington  and  Stiglitz,  p. 24-25.
37/  M. Marchand,  P. Pestieau,  H. Tulkens,  'The  Performance  of Public
Enterprises:  Normative,  Positive  and  Empirical  Issues,"  in  The  Performance
of  Public  Enterprises,  Marchand,  Pestieau,  Tulkens  (eds.),  North  Holland,
1984,  p. 23.
16Such a  contingent award insures the managers against some of  the
uncertainty  (managers  are,  as stated  above,  risk  averse)  but  retains  some
uncertainty  to provide  an incentive  to the managers.  To illustrate,
consider the  two  extremes: Compensation not  tied  to  the  firm's
profitability,  a flat  wage,  insures  against  uncertainty  but removes  all
incentive  for the  manager  to exert  effort.  Compensation  fully  tied to
the  firm's  profitability  subjects  the  manager  to  all  the  risks  associated
with  production.
22.  Although generally  applicable  results have not yet been
derived,38/  the principal-agent  literature  on managerial  incentives
indicates  that  the separation  of ownership  and control  of a public  firm
can be a source  of inefficiency.  The problem  can  be explicitly  handled
by modifying  the  managerial  incentive  structure  and  accountability  on a
case-by-case  basis.  It cannot simply  be assumed that public sector
managers  act in the  public  interest,  as  was done  in the  optimal  pricing
literature.39/  Rather,  managers'  contracts  and  terms  of employment  must
provide  incentives  to induce  them  to act  as if they  were maximizing  the
government's  objectives. Access  to information  to monitor  managerial
performance  is essential  to the success  of such  an incentive  structure;
information  available  to owners  enables  them to draft contracts  which
include  terms  for  managerial  rewards  based on performance. Therefore,
efforts to  increase  efficiency  in public transport should consider
appropriate  managerial incentives  and improvement  in the quality of
information  available to  the  government for monitoring managerial
performance.
Management  and  Labor
23.  The  problem  of  control  between  management  and  labor  is  similar
to the  problem  of control  between  owners  and  managers. In this  case  the
38/  Op.  Cit.,  Marchand,  Pestieau,  and  Tulkens,  p. 24.
39/  D.  Bos  and  W.  Peters,  "Privatization,  Internal  Control,  and  Internal
Regulation,"  Journal  of Public  Economics,  36,  1988,  p. 231-258.
17manager  is the  principal  who designs  a contract  which  induces  workers  to
exert  an  optimal  level  of effort,  given  the  limited  ability  of  management
to observe  labor's  exertion  of effort  on the job.  Such a contract  may
result  in  wages  higher  than  the  marginal  productivity  of labor  (i.e.  the
competitive  wage  rate). These  'efficiency  wages"40/  reward  labor  for  not
shirking  on the job by paying  a high wage.  If a worker is caught
shirking, the  punishment is  losing his/her job  and  spending time
unemployed.
24.  The  relationship  between  pay  and  effort  is  well-known  and  has
been  addressed  in  other  studies  of  public  sector  reform.41/  Viewing  labor
agreements  in a principal-agent  framework,  however,  highlights  the key
elements  to  the  success  of increasing  wages:  the  positive  probability  that
a  worker  will be discovered  if  he/she  shirks  on the  job  and  the  positive
probability  of  dismissal.  Extensive  interviews  with  railway  managers  and
others in this field  reveal  that inadequate  pay,  wage compression  and
difficulty  of dismissal  are largely  responsible  for low  worker  morale,
lack  of motivation  and,  in the  extreme,  absenteeism  when  workers  report
to work merely to retain their secure positions.42/  To increase
productivity  adequate incentives  should therefore  be paid to labor,
combined  with the inst:tution  of an effective  monitoring  system  that
enables  managers  to de  ct shirking  on the job.  Employees  must also
recognize  that their  positions  are not secure,  but may be lost  through
dismissal  or by closure  of the  enterprise.
40/  See Janet Yellin, "Efficiency  Wage Models of Unemployment,"  The
American  Economic  Review,  Vol.  74,  No.  2,  May 1984,  p. 200-205.  and  Carl
Shapiro and Joseph Stiglitz, 'Equilibrium  Unemployment  as a  Worker
Discipline  Device,"  The American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 74,  No. 3, June
1984,  p. 433-444.
41/  See  David  L. Lindauer,  Government  Pay and  Employment  Policies  and
Government  Performance  in Developing  Economies,  The  World  Bank,  PPR  WPS
42,  August  1988,  p. 9-11.
42/  Op Cit,  Eric  Beshers,  p. 5-10.
18Government and Enterprise
25.  A third crucial layer  of control is  between government  and the
enterprise  itself  The  government  may  impose  financial  targets,
expenditure or cash limits, capital  allocations, pricing and productivity
targets, etc., on the enterprise.  The imposition of these constraints
will  force the enterprise to operate inefficiently and employ a non-
optimal mix of inputs.43/  A more complicated,  yet more realistic,  way to
approach the problem of control between the government and the enterprise
is to view these financial  targets and capital allocations  not as genuine
constraints on behavior, but as resulting from the bargaining process
between the government and the enterprise.44/  The government's goal is
assumed to be welfare-maximization, whereas the enterprise is assumed to
act  in  the  interests of  those who  operate  it: the managers  and  the
workers.45/  The enterprise, thus  prefers to be constrained to earn a
relatively low level of profit and to receive a relatively  high capital
allocation.  The determination  of the  tinancial  constraint  and the capital
allocation are the outcome of discussions and negotiations between the
government and the enterprise.  However, the enterprise chooses which
operational information to reveal to the government.  Thus the financial
constraint and capital allocation depend on the enterprise's strategic
selection  of information.  The larger  the  asymmetry  of information  between
government and the enterprise, and  about the enterprise's  operations, the
less able government is to control the enterprise.  The bargaining and
negotiation  process  itself  can also play  a  role in  determining what
constraints are placed on the enterprise.
43/  R.  Rees,  "A  Positive  Theory  of  Public  Enterprise,"  in  The
Performance  of Public  Enterprises,  Marchand, Pestieau,  and  Tulkens (eds.),
North Holland, 1984, p. 179-191.
44/  H.S. E. Gravelle, 'Bargaining  and Efficiency in Public and Private
Sector  Firms,'  in  The  Performance  of  Public  Enterprises,  Marchand,
Pestieau, and Tulkens (eds.),  North Holland, 1984, p.193-220.
45/  This section is based on R. Rees,  'The Public Enterprise Game,'
E:onomic Journal, 1984, p. 109-123.
19Reaulation
26.  Regulation is  ultimately  a  means to  induce  private  enterprises
to  behave  in  a  more  socially  optimal  way  than  if  they  were  left
unregulated.  The regulating agency is assumed to have the goals of the
government and has the task of designing regulations which  induce the
enterprise to act as if it too were maximizing government objectives,
rather than its own.46/  Regulation of this sort is often applied to
private transport enterprises which,  if left unregulated, would  reduce
services  and  charge  higher  prices  in  pursuit  of  higher  profits.
Regulation may, for example, require a transport enterprise to provide
certain unprofitable services,  maintain low prices for  particular classes
of  consumers,  or  employ  a  specified number  of  workers.  Regulated,
privately-owned enterprises may  encounter the same problems as public
enterprises  whose objectives  are the  same  as those  mandated  by regulation.
27.  Regulation  may explicitly change the constrair,cs  under which
a firm operates and create distorted incentives in the use of resources.
A  well-known example of this phenomenon is the Averch-Johnson effect of
rate-of-return regulation.47/  An  increasing returns to scale firm, a
natural monopoly, is allowed to earn no more than a specified rate of
return on its captial.  A  profit-maximizing natural monopoly operating
under this constraint overcapitalizes  --  employs  more capital than in the
optimal  (unconstrained)  input  mix.  Rate-of-return  regulation  in
conjunction  with lump-sum subsidy  payments can lead to overcapitalization
beyond  the  Averch-Johnson  results.48/  Rate  of  return  regulation is
46/  John  Vickers  and George  Yarrow,  Privatization:  An Economic  Analysis,
The MIT  Press, Cambridge, 1988, p. 99-118 and Op Cit,  Sappingtor and
Stiglitz, p. 19.  Regulatory agencies  may also have their own goals  which
may be distinct from government's goals,
47/  Rate of return regulation allows a firm to earn a  "normal' rate-
of-return on its capital.  See  H. Averch and L. Johnson, "Behavior  of the
firm under  regulatory constraint," American Economic Review, Vol.  52,
1962, p. 1052-69.
48/  Op Cit, Kim and Spiegel, p. 105-119.
20relevant  for public  enterprises as  well  as  private  firms,  since  it
constrains  the  public  enterprise's  goal  of  welfare-maximization  and
distorts their input mix.49/  It can therefore be concluded, that rate-
of-return regulation imposed on public sector productiun is a potential
source uf inefficiency.
28.  A  pervasive  consequen(.e  of  regulation  in  transport  is  the
creation of a protected market --  essentially granting monopoLy power to
the  public  or  private  enterprise.  This  regulation  is often  called
"institutional"  barriers to entry, rather than a barrier to entry arising
from the nature of the  market or of production itself.  Typical examples
in transport include: licensing requirements for vehicles,  restricted
entry into urban transport, area and route licensing for buses, trucks,
and civil aviation, zoring or planning commission regulations, and high
costs  of  conducting environmental  impact  studies  and legal fees  for  entry.
Private transport  enterprises  may also cooperate to reduce competition  by
self-regulating  operations  and setting  fares.50/  If  these regulations  are
effective, then the  public or  private firmn  en,oys a  monopoly position  and,
as discussed below, may have little incentive to minimize costs.
Market Structure
29.  It has long been observed that a firm which enjoys monopoly
power  might  produce  output  at  a  higher  cost  than  would  a  firm  operating
in a competitive market.  It is believed that lack of competition widens
the area for discretionary behavior in the organization and eliminates
the  discipline  on  the  enterprise  to  lower  costs.51/  Standard
microeconomic theory,  however, implicity rules  out  any connection between
49/  Op Cit, Dieter Bos, p. 156.
50/  In Yemen driver cooperatives effectively operate route licensing
systems and set tariffs for passenger and freight transport.  Transport
Sector  Review,  Study  Report,  Yemen  Arab  Republic  Central  Planning
Organization, February 1982, p. 5.
51/  Op Cit, A. Israel, p. 93.
21a  dominant  position  in  the  output  market  and  a firm's  costs. In  producer
theory  the cost function  of a competitive  firm is assumed  to be the
minimum  cost of producing  a level  of output  with given  input  prices.52/
When  moving  beyond  the  competitive  market,  all  firms  are  still  assumed  to
be  profit  maximizers,  which  justifies  borrowing  the  ost  function  from  the
competitive  market and  attributing  cost  minimizing  behavior  to  the
monopolistic  firm (or imperfectly competitive firm) as well.53/  Under
these  assumptions  traditional  microeonomic  analys.s  cannot  provide  any
understanding  of  why  monopolistic  firms,  or  other  firms  enjoyiag  a  certain
degree of market power, may not  be operating at minimum cost.  As  a
consequence, little theoretical  work has been done to describe how output
markets can affect a firm's cost function.54/
30.  Leibenstein first coined the term  X-inefficiency to describe
the phenomenon  that a firm may not be operating  at minimum cost.55/
Although  X-inefficiency described  the lack  of cost  minimization in  private
firms, the concept is also appropriate for studying the inefficiency of
public  firms.  Many  public  enterprises  are  natural  monopolies,  or
monopolies protected by regulation.  Fxamples of natural monopolies in
transport  include  railroads  or  bridges;  an  example  of  monopoly  by
regulation  could  be urban transport.  The lack  of competitors  or  potential
competitors in the output market, or the lack of substitutes can be a
cause  of  X-inefficiency  in these  firms.56/  One  explanation of X-
52/  Hal  Varian,  Microeconomic  Analysis,  W.W. Norton  & Company,  New York,
1984, p.21.
53/  Ibid, p. 80.
54/  J.  Tirole,  The  Theory  of  Industrial  _4anization,  MIT  Press,
Cambridge MA, 1988, p.78.
55/  H.  Leibenstein, 'Allocative  Efficiency  vs. 'X-Efficiency',  "  American
Economic Review, Vol. 56, 1966, p. 392-415.
56/  See Op Cit, Vickers and Yarrow, p. 53-76 for possible limitations
of the effectiveness of competition to provide incentives for internal
efficiency in private firms as well:  in-contestable  markets, strategic
entry deterrence, and predatory behavior.
22inefficiency is that control of a firm's managers by the firm's owners
(shareholders)  is more  difficult under monopoly than under competition.
The  owners  do  not  have  "yardsticks' of  performance  available  from
observing the performance of rival firms for use in evaluating their own
managers'  performance.57/  The absence  of  "yardsticks"  by which  to
measure  managerial  performance  could  create  lack  of  cost  minimizing
behavior in both private and public sector  monopolies.  In the discussion
on  the  princioal-agent  problem  above,  it was  argued  that  imperfect
information constrains  the design  of optimal  contracts  for managers.
Information is valuable  to owners to the extent that the  information
enables owners to draft coaLtracts  which  induce managers  to exert the
optimal level of effort.  Competition can provide such a valuable source
of information;  managerial rewards  can  be  based on  performance comparisons
with managers of rival firms.58/  Competition  can also lower labor costs
and  increase productivity if management and labor recognize that high
wages  and  restrictive  practices  reduce  the  competitiveness  of  the
enterprise and perhaps threaten its very survival.
31.  Owners, either private or public, of natural monopolies or
monopolies  protected  from  competition by  institutional barriers  lack
information to evaluate managerial performance.  Therefore privatizing
public monopolies might not solve the problem of inefficient production.
Public ownership, however- may entail problems of control between owners
and managers distinct from those of a private firm.  The issue of public
ownership and its effect on cost  minimizing behavior is examined below.
Capital Markets and Public Ownership
32.  Public sector production may be less efficient than private
sector production due to the nature of public ownership itself.  Public
firms are  owned by  the many  citizens/tax payers cf  a  country, while
57/  Op Cit, J. Tl:ole, p. 76.
58/  Op Cit, Vickers and Yarrow, p. 69.
23private firms are owne4 by relatively  few shareholders.  Despite the lack
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residence,  voting5:  with  one's  feet,  or  po'itical  action)  considerably
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24willing to take action against perceived or real corruption and general
inefficiencies of the  public bureaucracy and public sec  to:.  A_cot  is  may
also be taken against eco  nomic  ills  resuli  n;t  fir-.  fis..a.
inefficient  public  production.  Yet  these  actions  art  ,  t.a:c8e  at  the
general  structure  or  specific  econTiiL:  austerity  r:iasures  ,  he  ".a.  th
inefficiencies  of  a  particular  £irm,  unless  the  Sirm  rovis  serviCes
directly  to  a  particular  constituency.  n r.this  case,  prrotest.  a-.d  a.  tior
to  improve  the  performance  of  the  public  enterprise,  HirseChml-an's  v;ci-e'
require  organization  of  the  affected  group  .622  Thb dlv,  th*
citizen/taxpayer  may be a beneficiary  of public  sector  inefficiency.  The
lack of a control mechanism for thM managers or employees may result in
a  slack  work  environment  at  guaranteed  wages.  Thls the citizen'taxpa,er
is  not likely to exert pressure on public f.rms to  minirmize  .-osts  as does
the shareholder of a private firm.
35.  Public  enterprises,  in  contrast  to  private  firms,  often  do  not
face  the  threat  of  insolvency,  the  ultimate  disciplinary  threat  fac.ing
private  firms  in  a  competitive  market.  A  public  firm  may  be  prote.ted  by
the  government  from  bankruotcy  "y ic.ds  to  !  '.ohr  c:t  is  ,  tax  exsr;.'i_`;ns
or  soft  credit  terms.  As  Ai>.usseJ  a'ove,  expeocati.ns  - -.  n
transfer  I-ayments  to,  covor  :c, . "cc:  t  '  'th  n,rrL-o  'e"
ccnstrai-.t  an:  re  ves  . - .e  :c  .'..  '.1.-.  . . . s-
m  c4:  :n  zat  cin.ct>,
Empirical  Evidence
36.  Despite  te  :)  b"t  =  ,.;  '.  .-  ..  - * .,,
inefficien-cy  of  pub.i  f i.ms  _n.  .
62/  A.  Hirs  chman,  Exit,  Vo 4,-  I  '_.v  iv:-  '
1970,  p.3C.
63/  Private  firms,  however,  vay  alsc  e::  .v  Tover.c.-ent  prote-t  -on  nro
insolvency.  Large  private  firms  which  emp';y  a  large  number  of  worker
may  be  saved  from  hankruptcy  by  the  government  in  order  to  prevent  r%ass
unemploymernt  and  social.  dislocatiln.  Chrys'r  Corp)raton  ;r  nt  '  P,.'.  S
one well-known exam.ple.
25empirical evidence supporting this result.  Empirical studies comparing
public and private firms in the same industry and operating in the same
market  have  found  that  ownership  is  not  a  significant  variable  in
determining  costs.64/  While  moving  from  a  protected  market  to  a
competitive  market may reduce the costs of urban public transport,65/ the
few studies comparing costs of public and private transport enterprises
operating under the same  market conditions do not support  the proposition
that  public enterprises  are less  efficient.  While the  private Australian
airline was found to be more efficient than the state-owned airline,66/
there was no significant difference in operating costs between Canada's
private and public railroads.67/
37.  A potential explanation for this empirical  result is that
private firms may be  inefficient for the same reasons that the public
firms  are inefficient.  Each  of the  causes of inefficiency  described  above
--  asymmetric information  and principal-agent  problems,  market power, and
regulation  --  can lead to  inefficiencies  in  both private and  public firms.
Privatization  might not therefore  be the correct remedy for  public sector
inefficiency, since  th^  resultant  private firm  may be inefficient  as  well.
A  policy  designed  to  rectify  the  cause  of  inefficiency  --  such  as
modification  of  managerial  incentives,  introduction  of  competition,
regulatory reform,  or any  necessary combination of these --  could be more
effective in promoting efficient production than privatization, or any
other policy reform used in isolation.
64/  Op Cit, Millward and Parker, p. 235-259.
65/  S. Glsister and W. Cox, "Report  on  Worshop 3: The Bidding Process,"
Conference  on  Competition  and  Ownership  of  Bus  and  Coach  Services,
Thredbo, Australia, May 1989, p. 2-3.
66/  D. Davies, "The  efficieacy of public versus private firms: the case
of Australia's two airlines," Journal of Law and Economics, 14, 1971, p.
149-165.
67/  Caves  and  Christensen,  "The relative  efficiency  of  public  and
private  firms  in  a  competitive  environment:  the  case  of  Canadian
railroads," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 88, 1980, p. 958-76.
26IV.  A  FRAMEWORK: IDENTIFYING  CAUSES OF  INEFFICIENCY
IN  PUBLIC  TRANSPORT
38.  It is difficult  for  an economist  or auditor  to distinguish
between the expenditures  used to accomplish  the various and often
competing  goals  of  public  enterprises.  Managers  of  public  enterprises  may
even  disguise  production  inefficiencies  as  the  necessary  costs  of  pursuing
other  goals  of  the  enterprise.  Reform  of  public  transport  to  promote  cost
mlinimizing  behavior  must therefore  consider  the  various  possible  causes
of inefficiency  in a systematic  and  integrated  manner. Focusing  on one
source  of inefficiency  in isolation  could lead to facile,  ineffective
reforms  if  other  sources  of inefficiency  are  not addressed  as  well.  The
framework  developed  here provides  a generic  method  of identifying  the
causes  of inefficiencies  in  public  transport.
39.  From  the  above discussion five interrelated  causes of
inefficiency  in  public  sector  transport  can  be deduced:
(i)  The  goals  of the  enterprise,  or regulatory
constraints  on its  operations.
(ii)  The structure  of the  output  market.
(iii)  The control  mechanism  between  government
and  the  enterprise.
(iv)  The  managerial  incentive  structure.
(v)  The  conditions  of employment  for  labor.
These five areas should be examined in turn to identify  causes of
inefficiency  and  to  help formulate  an appropriate  combination  of reforms
to promote  improved  efficiency. Following  the steps  below  enables  the
reformer  to pinpoint  links  and  interdependencies  between  the  alternative
reform  policies. Success  of reforms  at each  step  critically  depends  on
reforms  in  the  previous  steps. Designing  control  mechanisms  between  each
layer in the hierarchy  for controling  the enterprise  (the last three
steps) relies on the definition  of the enterprise's  goals and the
structure  of the  output  market  (Steps  1 and 2) for  criteria  to evaluate
27the  performance  of  the  enterprise,  its  management,  and  labor. Success  of
reforms  also  depends  on  the  steps  which  follow. For  example,  introducing
competition  (Step  2) cannot  succeed  unless  the  control  mechanism  between
the  government  and the  enterprise  (Step  3) reinforces  the  discipline  of
the  competitive  market.
Step  1:  The  Goals  of the  Enterprise
40.  The first step in analyzing  the causes  of inefficiency  in
public  transport  is  the  delineation  of  the  goals  of  the  enterprise,  or  the
regulations  imposed on it by  the government.  If the goal of the
enterprise  is simply  to maximize  consumer  welfare --  the provision  of
transport services at  minimum cost  --  and  the enterprise is not
constrained  by  regulations,  then  the  analysis  proceeds  to  Step  .:. If  the
enterprise  pursues  goals  other  than  maximization  of  consumer  welfare,  the
description  of these goals is the first task in identifying  their
contribution  to  operational  inefficiency.  Goals  of  transport  enterprises
may include  distributional  objectives,  or  provision  of  secure  employment.
While  these  goals  may  not be clear-cut  objectives  of the  enterprise,  the
government  may impose  these  goals  through  regulations. For  example,  the
government  may regulate  fares to provide low-price  services  for low-
income customers or favored interest groups, or the government  may
strictly  regulate  the  labor  market. A politically  powerful  labor  union
m;.y  also  be able  to impose  labor  intensive  work rules  on the  enterprise
as effectively  as explicit  government  regulations.
41.  Once  these  goals  and  their  effects  on operational  efficiency
have been identified  and recognized,  a choice  can be made between  the
costs  and  benefits  of  pursuing  these  goals. Whether  or  not  the  objectives
are  changed,  specifying  the  goals  of the  enterprise  is  a  prerequisite  to
measuring  the  performance  of  the  enterprise  and  evaluating  the  performance
28of --  and  fixing incentives for  --  its  management.68/  Contract  plans can
be useful  in  delineating  the  objectives  of the  enterprise.69/
Step  2:  The  Structure  of the  Output  Market
42.  The  structure of  the  output market may  influence the
operational  efficiency  of  a  public transport enterprise.  While a
competitive  output  market  provides  both  market  discipline  and  information
necessary  to  design  control  mechanisms  for  the  enterprise,  management,  and
labor,  market  power  may be a source  of inefficiency.  If the  enterprise
operates  in  a competitive  market,  proceed  to Step 3.  If the  enterprise
is  a monopoly  or occupies  a dominant  position  in the  market,  the source
of this  market  power  must  be ascertained.  Market  power  can result  from
regulation,  absence  of alternative  modes of transport,  or increasing
returns  to scale  of  production.
43.  Deregulation  to remove  barriers  to entry,  introduction  of
competition  or competition  surrogates  can increase  the pressure  on a
public  enterprise  to produce  efficiently.  In  the  case  of  deregulation,
the  actual  or potential  entrance  of rival  firms  can force  an enterprise
to lower  costs  to remain  competitive  or  prevent  entrance  of a  rival  firm.
In the  case of a natural  monopoly  which does  not face competition  from
potential  entrants,70/  market surrogates  can help compel  the firm to
operate  efficiently.  These surrogates  can include  the pressure  from
clients  or beneficiaries  of the enterprise,71/  or competitive  bidding
68/  Op  Cit,  A. Israel,  p. 48-52.
69/  Contract Plans also stipulate performance  objectives  for  the
enterprise  and  government  obligations  to the  enterprise.  Contract  Plans,
however, are not legally  enforceable  documents  and therefore  cannot
substitute for  the  control mechanism between government and  the
enterprise.  See  J.  Nellis, Contract Plans and  Public Enterprise
Performance,  The  World  Bank,  PPR  WPS-118,  October  1988.
70/  ie.  a  natural  monopoly  operating  in  a  non-contestable  market.
71/  Op Cit,  Hirschman,  p. 63.
29against sub-contractors  to  provide selected in-house services.72/
Introduction  of  competition  or  market  surrogates,  however,  cannot  generate
operational  efficiency  unless  the control  mechanism  between  government
and the  enterprise  reinforces  the  discipline  imposed  by competition  and
incorporates  any  information  provided  by a competitive  market.
Step  3:  The  Control  Mechanism  between  the  Government  and  the  Enterprise
44.  The  control mechanism between the  government and  the
enterprise  may "soften'  the  enterprise's  budget  constraint  and  undermine
market  discipline  or other  inducements  to  lower  costs. In  the  case  of  an
enterprise  which is a department  or agency of the government,  most
revenues  collected  are  deposited  directly  with the  Treasury  and  budgetary
allocations  from  general  fiscal  revenues  cover  the  costs  of  operations.73/
Revenues  and expenditures  are not matched  and are recorded  on a cash
basis.  Expenditure  allocations  cannot therefore be  contingent on
performance, because such  an  accounting system does not  provide
information  on profitability  and performance  of the enterprise.  In
addition,  while the government  may prescribe  a level  of revenue  to be
raised,  few  restraints  are  possible  on  the  level  of  costs  if  the  costs  are
covered  by an  allocation  of fiscal  revenues  decided  as part  of  the  annual
budgetary  process.74/  In  this  case,  the  competition  for  public  funds  and
the bargaining process between the government and the ministry or
enterprise  can inhibit  costs:  the procedures  for allocating  government
expenditures  determine  the  level  of  expenditures  and  the  "softness"  of  the
enterprise's  budget  constraint.
72/  Op Cit.  Heggie,  p.26.
73/  Op Cit,  Heggie,  p. 28.
74/  Other  consequences  of an agency's  "soft"  budget  constraint  may be
the poor revenue  administration  and the  lack  of control  of expenditures
described  in I. Heggie  and  M. Quick,  A Framework  for  Analyzing  Financial
Performance  of the  Transport  Sector,  Working  Paper  No.  WPS 356,  February
1990,  p.11-13.
3045.  Although a  public transport  enterprise  may have its own
operating  budget  and  an  accounting  system  which  could  provide  information
on performance,  the  government  may  nonetheless  subsidize  the  enterprise
or grant  soft  credit  terms  to  cover  deficits  or fund investment.75/  The
government  may also protect  the enterprise  from dissolution  by these
measures. The  more the  enterprise  can  rely  on subsidies  and  soft  credit
terms,  the  more their  receipt  is  built  into  the  expectations  of  managers
and  the  softer  will  be the  budget  constraint.  The  soft  budget  constraint
may  destroy  not  only  incentives  to  perform  efficiently,  but  may  weaken  the
desire  to  maintain  adequate  information  to  evaluate  this  performance.  The
softness  of the  budget  constraint  encourages  poor  record  keeping,  lack  of
control  of expenditures,  and  the  ex  post  adjustment  of accounts  which  is
so  pervasive  in  public  transport  enterprises  in  developing  countries.76/
The  expectation  of transfer  payments  to cover  total  costs  eliminates  the
incentive  to  maintain  records  of expenditures  - the  matching  of revenue
with  expenditutes  becomes  merely  an  accounting  identity.  It is  important
to reiterate  here the  effects  on operational  efficiency  of implementing
a firm-specific  optimal  pricing  formula  for  cost recovery. Prices  that
allow  an  enterprise  to  cover  costs  taking  the  costs  as a  given  removes  the
incentive  to reduce  costs because  higher costs are simply recovered
through  higher  prices.
46.  The success  of enterprise  reform  depends  critically  on the
information  the government  has  to evaluate the performance  of the
enterprise  and  the  discipline  imposed  on  the  enterprise  by the  government
and the market  place.  The firmness  of the budget  constraint  and the
possibility  of the enterprise  becoming  insolvent  if production  is not
efficient,  may also  induce  management  and  labor  to lower  costs.
75/  The following  comments  also apply  to private  firms  which receive
government  subsidies,  soft  credit  terms,  or tax  credits.
76/  Op  Cit, Heggie  and  Quick,  p. 13.
31Step  4: Managerial  Incentive  Structure
47.  Managers  may  have  little  incentive  to  exert  effort  to  minimize
costs because  their efforts  cannot  be measured  or observed  and their
performance  may  not  be  rewarded.  Managers  of  public  transport  enterprises
may  also face  little  pressure  to  perform  because  they  cannot  easily  lose
control  of the  enterprise:  the  government  may  protect  the  enterprise  from
insolvency  and dissolution. An effective  incentive  system  that induces
managers  to  exert  effort  to  lower  costs  would  require  explicit  managerial
objectives,  criteria  to  measure  achievement  of these  objectives,  rewards
for performance,  and sanctions  for inefficiencies.  If the existing
managerial  incentive  structure  does not include these elements, the
structure  can be reformed:  the goals  of the enterprise  can be defined
(Step 1),  information  to  evaluate performance  can  be  obtained by
introducing  market  discipline  (Step  2) and  observing  management  of rival
firms  or,  in an  uncompetitive  market,  by instituting  internal  accounting
systems.  The  information  must  be accompanied  by a  pay  scale  which  rewards
performance. The government  can tighten  the budget  constraint  of the
enterprise  by reducing  or removing  subsidies,  hardening  credit  terms,  and
pricing  according  to costs (Step  3).  Management  that is rewarded  for
performance  will  have  incentives  to  implement  control  mechanisms  designed
to increase  labor  productivity.
Step  5: The  Conditions  of Employment  for  Labor
48.  Similar  to  management,  labor  may  have  little  incentive  to  work
efficiently:  monitoring  of effort may be difficult,  performance  not
rewarded,  and the possibility  of being made redundant  may be slim.
Powerful  labor  unions  may be able to impose  labor-intensive  work rules
raising  labor  costs  and lowering  labor  productivity.
49.  Reducing the contribution  of  labor inefficiency  to poor
overall  operational  performance  can be accomplished  by reducing  labor
redundancy  and  designing  a  control  mechanism  which  provides  incentives  for
performance. Definition  of goals  (Step  1) determines  the importance  of
32retaining labor as an  objective of  the enterprise.  If providing
employment  is not  a goal  of the  enterprise,  policies  can  be designed  to
remove  redundant  labor.77/ The introduction  of  ccmpetition  (Step  2) and
firm  budget  constraints  (Step  3)  may  convince  organized  labor  that  labor-
intensive  practices  diminish  the  competitiveness  of  the  enterprise  and  may
result  in the loss of all jobs through  dissolution  of the enterprise.
Studies  of rival  firms (Step  2) or firms  in similar  services  in other
regions  or  countries  may  provide  information  to  assess  labor  requirements.
Increased  wages  paid  to individual  workers  to increase  productivity  must
be accompanied  by  nformation  to  evaluate  performance,  combined  with the
possibility  of reduction  of benefits  or dismissal. The success  of such
a  program  depends  on  managers  who  have  incentives  to  perform  and  who  exert
effort  to  monitor,  motivate,  and  evaluate  their  workers  (Step  4).
77/  See  Op Cit,  Galenson,  p. 33-52.
33V.  THE  CASE  OF  CONRAIL  78/
50.  Conrail,  which is now a private  railroad,  was owned  by the
United  States  government  from  1976 to 1988.  During  much of that  time,
Conrail suffered  financial  losses  of the order of $1 million a day.
Taking  a snapshot  of Conrail  while it  was owned  by the government,  the
analysis  below  sketches  the  m.ajor  policy  reforms  which  lowered  Conrail's
operating  costs,  increased  its  revenues  and facilitated  its  sale  to the
private  sector.
Background
51.  Although  railroads  have  traditionally  been  privately  owned  in
the  United  States  they  have also been thought  to be highly  profitable
monopolies. Followin-  formation  of the Interstate  Commerce  Commission
(ICC)  in  1881,  they  weru  therefore  heavily  regulated  to  ensure  they  served
the public  interest  as well as the interests  of their  private  owners.
These  regulations,  dating  from  the  years  of  the 'robber  barons,"  required
railroads  to  maintain  a wide range  of unrenumerative  services  (favoring
certain  regions,  classes  of shippers,  or particular  passenger  services),
to abide  by restrictive  labor  practices  sanctioned,  or imposed  by the
Congress  at the behest  of the rail  unions,  and to set specified  rates
which  effectively  subsidized  passenger  services.  While  overall  operations
were  sustainable  under  these  regulations  until  the  end  of  the  1930s,  post-
war  railroads  became  increasingly  subject  to  competition  from  trucking  for
freight  traffic,  and airlines,  buses, a..d  private  cars for passenger
traffic. The railroads  rapidly  lost  their  profit  margins.  The  problem
was  most severe  in  the  Northeast  as the  structure  of the  regional  economy
78/  The sources  of information  for this part are Eric W. Beshers,
Conrail:  Government  Creation  & Frivatization  of an American  Railroad,
INUTD  Discussion  Paper,  No. 38,  March 1989 and  conversations  with, and
information  provided  by, Louis Thompson,  Railways  Advisor,  INUTD,  The
World  Bank.
34shifted  from  manufacturing  to service-oriented  industries. In 1970  the
Penn Central  Railroad (PC)  applied  for bankruptcy.  Railroads  in the
United  States,  however,  were prohibited  from liquidating  as would have
been the case with other  businesses.  Following  the law, rather  than
permitting  liquidation,  the  Federal  bankruptcy  judge  assigned  to the  PC
case ordered  a financial  restructuring  of the railroad  in search  of an
income-based  reorganization.  In early 1973 when the PC  Trustees,
following  the  procedures  required  by the  Railway  Labor  Act,  put forward
a plan to eliminate  redundant  labor  and thus reduce  operating  costs
(since, without these changes, an  income-based  reorganization  was
impossible),  the rail unions went on strike  and stopped  operations.
Congress  responded immediately  by passing legislation  to override a
proposed  cut  in  crew  sizes  and  required  the  railroad  to resume  operations.
In the interim  it also agreed  to provide  a subsidy  to compensate  the
owners. The  'ankruptcy  judge,  however,  determined  that  PC  was  so  burdened
by uneconomic  services,  rates set below costs,  and excess labor  that
revenues  simply  could  not  cover  the  railroad's  operating  costs  and that
financial  reorganization  would  be futile  without  the  necessary  changes.
Ruling  that requiring  PC to continue  operating  under these conditions
violated  the  Fifth  Amendment  of the  US Constitution,  which  prohibits  the
use of private  property  for public  use without  just compensation,  the
judge  ordered  the  railroad  to be liquidated.
The  Birth  of Conrail
52.  The  decision  of  the  bankruptcy  judge  to  liquidate  Penn  Central
forced  the  government  to  act  quickly  if  it  wished  to  maintain  rail  service
in  the  Northeast.  Under  the  Regional  Rail  Reorganization  Act  of  1973,  the
government  created  Conrail  to  acquire  and  operate  designated  portions  of
the  bankrupt PC.  The  United States Railway Association (USRA),
established to  be  independent of  Congress, the  Department of
Transportation  (DOT), and  the  ICC, was  charged with  studying the
feasibility  of  Conrail  and  designating  which  properties  should  be  conveyed
to the government.  Congress  instructed  the USRA to organize  a rail
service  that  was self-supporting,  met the  region's  service  requirements,
35preserved  existing  patterns  of rail  service,  provided  passenger  services,
and  minimized  job losses  in places  served  by the existing  rail system.
In 1976,  mo.t of the  assets  ot the  bankrupt  PC  were conveyed  to Conrail
via the  government.
The  Operation  of Conrail
53.  In  initially  pursuing  the  goals  listed  above,  Conrail  operated
as  a  publicly-owned  railroad  with  essentially  the  same  constraints  as did
the  privately-owned  PC operating under regulation.  The  fina.xcial
performance  of  Conrail  was  consequently  little  different  fro  .aat  of PC;
at the  outset  it continued  to lose  about  $1 million  per day.  However,
when  Congress  was  faced  with the  facts  of  Conrail's  condition,  and  after
it  was  convinced  that  no other  solution  was  possible,  it chose  to reform
the railroad  rather  than continue  to finance  operations  indefinitely,
Meanwhile,  by the  late  1970's,  the  rail  unions  realized  they  had  lost  the
ability  to dictate  the labor  conditions  initially  set  out in Congress'
response  to the PC bankruptcy.  Recognizing  that the entire  US rail
industry  was facing  serious  financial  difficulties  --  Midwestern  rail
companies  were facing bankruptcy  and one company had actually  been
liquidated  --  and  that  Conrail  could  not rely  on Congress  for  unlimited
financial  support,  the  rail  unions  were  finally  willing  to  accept  wage  and
labor  force  reductions  to  help  bolster  the  railroad's  financial  position.
54.  With the support  of a broad  constituency  of rail interests
which  supported  regulatory  reform,  including  rail  labor,  the  Staggers  Act
of 1980 (which  dealt  primarily  with regulatory  reform)  and the  Northeast
Rail Service  Act (NERSA)  of 1981,  removed  many of the  regulations  which
had precipitated  the collapse  of PC and were largely  responsible  for
Conrail's  poor financial  condition. The Staggers  Act allowed  railroads
wide latitude  in setting  rates,  permitted  them to enter into  contracts
with shippers,  and liberalized  procedures  for abandoning  unremunerative
lines. NERSA  formalized  the  unions'  wage  concessions  to  Conrail,  relieved
Conrail  of all obligation  to carry commuter  passengers,  and specified
Conrail's  right  to  eliminate  labor  positions  and  limit  severance  pay. If
36local  and state  authorities  desired  commuter  rail  services,  they  had to
assume responsibility  for  supporting  these services; the Federally
supported  Amtrak  had,  since  1971,  taken  over  responsibility  for  all  inter-
city  passenger  services. The  provisions  in  NERSA  allowed  Conrail  to  earn
a  profit  and  achieve  the  Act's  objective  of  returning  rail  services  to  the
private  sector. Costs  fell  and  efficiency  rose  dramatically  in the two
years  following  reform:  operating  costs  fell  33  per  cent  and  ton-miles  per
employee  rose  32  per  cent  between  1981  and  1983. In  1986,  Conrail's  stock
was sold  to the  public  and  the  corporation  was successfully  returned  to
the  private  sector.
Analysis
55.  The analysis below, following  the Steps of Chapter IV,
illustrates  some of the important  connections  between  the  goals  of the
enterprise,  the  market  structure,  the  control  mechanism  between  government
and  the  enterprise,  and  labor  employment  policies  in  executing  successful
railroad  reform. At the  outset,  it is important  to reiterate  Besher's
observation  that  certain  individuals  --  combined  with  sustained  political
will on the part of the Administration  and Congress  --  played  crucial
roles  in  the  success  of the  railroad  reforms. He  also  noted  tha.  it  took
thirteen  years  and $8  billion  to  compltte  the  reform  of the  Northeastern
railroad that eventually sold for  $2  billion, demonstrating  that
successful  reform of transport  enterprises  is a slow, difficult  and
expensive  process,  even  3n  a  comparatively  wealthy  and  stable  societv  l.ke
the  United  States.
Step  1: The  Goals  of Conrail  Conrai.'s  initial  goals  were to be self-
supporting,  meet  service  requirements  of the  Northeast,  preserve  existing
patterns of  rail service,  provide required  passenger services, and
minimize  job  losses  in  places  served  by rail. The  interests  of the  rail
unions were  embodied in legislation  that maintained existinig  over-
staffing  levels. Thus  an implicit  initial  goal  of  Conrail  was to  provide
employment. The  pursuit  of these  mutually  incompatible  corporate  goals
resulted  in operational  inefficiency:  high labor  costs  together  with the
37losses  involved  in  maintaining  services  on  unremunerative  lines. In the
late  1970's  it  became  clear  to  the  government,  unions,  and  state  and  local
authorities  that, under current  market conditions,  accomplishing  the
multiple  and  conflicting  goals  of Conrail  would  not  be possible  without
access  to  continuing  flows  of  Federal  funds.  Direct  Federal  payments  to
Conrail  exceeded  $3  billion  between  1976  and  1981. The  costs  of  achieving
these  goals  were considered  too  high  in  relation  to  the  benefits  accruing
to the particular  constituencies  whose interests  were served  by the
prevailing  rail  regulations.
Step 2: The Output  Markets  Conrail's  predecessor  provided  serv'ces  in
three  separate  markete: freight, commuter services, and  inter-city
passenger  services. There  was strong  competition  from  alternative  modes
of transportation  in each  of these  markets. W4hile  competition  provided
incentives  to lower  operating  costs, regulations  restricted  Conrail's
ability  set  fares,  wages  and  employment  levels. Despite  the  competitive
market  environment,  these restrictions  constrained  earnings  and raised
operating  costs.  Treating  each market  separately,  however,  helped  to
locate  profit  centers  and identify  areas  of financial  weakness.  As a
result,  Conrail  eventually  conveyed  or closed  its  unremunerative  services
and  transferred  responsibility  for  passenger  services  to  local  or Federal
control.
Step 3: The Control  Mechanism  between  the  Government  and Conrail  The
ccntrol mechanism between the government and Conrail temporarily removed
the  competitive  pressures  on  Conrail  to  reduce  costs. Government  funding
wsoftened'  the  budget  constraint  by covering  all  those  operating  expenses
not covered  by  revenues.  Although the Conrail Board included  the
Secretary  of Transportation  --  a fact which,  with suitable  technical
support,  gave  the  Administration  access  to  the  same  information  as  Conrail
management --  the  division  of  control  and  responsibility  among  Conrail,
the  Administration, and  Congress  hampered  the  ability  of  the
Administration  to reform  the railroad.  While the Administration  had
direct  access  to information  on  Conrail's  performance,  Congress  did  not.
Conrail  built  a constituency  in Cong-ess  which initially  prevented  the
38administration  from  using  the  leverage implicit in  its  superior
information  to  institute  regulatory  reform. Only  when  Congress  agreed  to
the  necessary  reforms  to  privatize  Conrail  and  prevent  the  establishment
of  a  permanent  "soft"  budget  constraint  did  it  create  a  control  mechanism
capable  of prom,oting  operational  efficiency.  The  establishment  of  a firm
budget  constraint  --  ar.  owner  willing  to liquidate  the  railroad  and  sell
off its as:ets  --  reinforced  the market  discipline  of competition  and
persuaded  mainagement  and  labor  of the  necessity  of fundamental  reform.
Step  4:  Managerial  Incentive  Structure The  introduction  of  a firm  budget
constraint  was reinforced  by placing  a competent  manager  in charge  of
Conrail.  The new management  was both convinced  of the necessity  to
reshape  the railroad  and  had the  knowledge  and  capability  to accomplish
this  task  and  run  the  railroad  efficiently.
Step 5: The Conditions  of Employment The labor  unions,  realizing  that
insolvency  of Conrail  and  most other  railroads  was possible  (and  indeed
that  the  government  was  quite  willing  to  break  up the  corporation  and  sell
off its assets  to other railroads),  compromised  on labor  practices  to
prevent  dissolution  of Conrail  and  loss  of  all  jobs.  The  willingness  of
organized  labor  to  agree  to changes  in  working  practices,  wage reductions
and general  regulatory  reform  was a key element  which contributed  to
lowering  operating  costs  and  improving  service  quality.
39VI.  CONCLUSIONS
56.  This  paper  has identified  possible  causes  of inefficiency  in
public transport: market power,  principal-agent  or control  problems,
regulation,  and  'soft'  budget  constraints  due  to  subsidies  or soft  credit
terms  which protect  enterprises  from insolvency. This review  helps  to
direct  further  research,  both  theoretical  and  empirical,  to some  of the
issues  not yet explored  concerning  costs in public  enterprises. This
research  would  advance  the  development  of an integrated  theory  of  public
production.
57.  The first issue to consider  is the relationship  between
pricing  policies  and costs.  Empirical  work is needed to compare  the
welfare  gains  from  instituting  optimal  pricing  policies,  with the  welfare
losses  which might result from 'cost  drift, in firms which receive
transfer  payments. Theoretical  work  to integrate  the  receipt  of transfer
payments  and  the enterprises  cost function,  for  both  public  and  private
firms,  would  provide  an analytical  framework  within  which to study  the
observed  phenomena that costs 'drift'  in firms receiving  government
subsidies.
58.  The  second  issue  is  the  relationship  between  the  nature  of  the
output  market and production  costs.  While introducing  competition  is
promoted as a  means of  imposing financial discipline  on  a  public
enterprise,  increasing  pressures to minimize costs, there is little
theoretical  basis  for  this  recommendation.  Theoretical  work  is  needed  to
formulate  a  model  of  costs  that  depends  in some  way  on the  firm's  degree
of market power.  More sharply focussed  empirical  work would help
determine  the  magnitude  and  causes  of  cost  differences  between  enterprises
operating  in uncompetitive  markets,  compared  with those operating  in
competitive  markets.  Case studies showing  the impact  of introducing
competition  into  transport  markets,  and  the  cost response  of enterprises
facing  such  competition,  would  be a useful  step  in  this  direction.
4059.  A  wider question  is determining  the relative  efficiency  of
public  and  private  sector  production.  First,  the  differences  in  control
problems at all  levels between public and private firms should  be
evaluated.  Theoretically,  the  defining characteristics  of  public
production  should  be modeled  to distinguish  public  ownership  from  other
features  of public production,  such as support  from the government,
problems  of asymmetric  information  and control,  and  market  power,  which
may  be shared  by  private  production.  Once  these  defining  characteristics
have been modeled,  the next step would be to model the relationship
between  public  ownership  and  costs.  More empirical  work would then  be
required  to  discern  the  significance,  if  any,  of ownership  in  explaining
differences  in  costs  between  private  and  public  firms. This  investigation
would  enhance  understanding  of public  production  and  inform  the  debate  on
appropriate  policies  for  cost recovery  and reducing  inefficiency  in the
public  sector.
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